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ABSTRACT
Recently many philosophers and social choice theorists have questioned
traditional welfare egalitarianism by introducing a notion of responsibility.
They propose to distinguish between two sets of individual characteristics: those
for which individuals are to be kept responsible and those for which they can be
compensated.  This approach raises the related questions of where to draw the
line between these two sets of characteristics and how to operationalise the
notion of “responsibility-sensitive fair compensation”.  The answers to these
questions may depend on the cultural context.  We present some empirical
results from questionnaire studies in Belgium, Burkina Faso and Indonesia.  The
notion of control seems to play an important role in determining the variables
for which individuals are to be held responsible.  The strong notion of “full
compensation” is clearly rejected in favour of more conservative distribution
rules.  Moreover, a large fraction of the respondents take the non-liberal
position that the talented should be punished if they do not use their talents in a
productive way.  We find some intercultural differences.  Belgian students are
more in favour of redistribution.  Indonesian students are the most conservative.
While the Pareto principle is decisively rejected in Burkina Faso and Belgium, it
is accepted by a majority of the Indonesian sample.
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2RESPONSIBILITY-SENSITIVE FAIR COMPENSATION
IN DIFFERENT CULTURES
Erik Schokkaert
Kurt Devooght
1.  INTRODUCTION
The traditional welfare economic interpretation of the egalitarian ideal has been in terms
of individual welfare levels.  Second-best analysis introduces the complications following
from incentives, but, while focusing on the trade-off with efficiency, does not depart from
the welfare egalitarian ideal as such.  However, recently more and more economists and
philosophers did start questioning this welfare egalitarian ideal.  They have proposed to
incorporate some notion of responsibility in the formulation of distributive justice (see
Fleurbaey, 1998, for a recent survey of this literature).  This basically means that one has
to distinguish between two sets of individual characteristics: those for which individuals
have to be compensated and those for which they are to be held responsible.  Differences
in natural talent could be an obvious example of the former category, effort an example of
the latter.
However, while this is an obvious example, the divide between responsibility- and
compensation-variables is much less clear-cut in other cases.  As Dworkin (1981) is the
seminal article in this literature, Roemer (1996) has baptized the problem as the one of
locating Dworkin's cut.  Very broadly speaking, there are two basic approaches.  One -
defended by, e.g., Arneson (1989, 1990, 1991) and Cohen (1989, 1990)- emphasizes that
the degree of control is crucial: people can only be held responsible for (the consequences
of) the individual characteristics which follow from their own voluntary choice.
Government should only compensate for disadvantages due to personal characteristics
beyond the control of the agents.  People should not suffer as a result of things which they
have not voluntarily chosen.  Another approach -initiated by Dworkin (1981) but also
defended, e.g. by Scanlon (1988)- emphasizes that responsibility is by delegation: we feel
responsible (and are to be held responsible) for some choices, because these define our
identity.  Even if we are not in control, we still feel responsible and we would not accept
government interference. In Dworkin (1981) preferences are given as the prime example
of this kind of personal characteristics.  Government should hold agents responsible for
the preferences with which they identify. Only disadvantages resulting from personal
resources, whether under control or not, can be subject to compensation.  The
philosophical debate about these questions is not yet settled.  In fact, some authors
(Roemer, 1993) have taken a relativistic stance and have argued that the dividing line
between responsibility and compensation can be seen as culture-dependent, because it will
be influenced by the dominant physiological, psychological or social theories of man.
Even if one reached consensus on the location of Dworkin's cut, the first-best distribution
problem would not yet be solved.  Fleurbaey (1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1998) has shown in a
3series of papers that some very basic intuitions concerning responsibility-sensitive
egalitarianism are conflicting.  Therefore it is not a priori obvious what is the “best”
distribution mechanism to implement a responsibility-sensitive approach.  Moreover, in a
second-best world one has to go beyond the simple formulation of the egalitarian ideal to
define a complete ordering of social states.  Here also, there are conflicting possibilities:
the best known approach is the one proposed by Roemer (1993, 1996), but some
alternatives are sketched in Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van de gaer (1999).
How should these difficult normative questions be settled?  There can be no doubt that
“essential ingredients of a debate over normative issues are critical reflection and
thorough assessment of the arguments being used” (Bossert, 1998).  We do feel, however,
that this theoretical debate can also be enriched by bringing in some empirical information
on the moral intuitions and opinions of uninformed respondents (Miller, 1994).  This
information can make the theorists better aware of the limitations of their models and of
the possible influences from their own particular social and cultural background. There is
now a growing body of empirical work which starts from the assumptions in economic
theory.  The paper by Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) has been influential to strengthen the
criticism on welfarism, the results of Amiel and Cowell (1992) are equally destructive for
some of the basic axioms of inequality measurement (including the venerable Pigou-
Dalton criterion).  An overview of some other contributions is in Schokkaert (1998).
Empirical work can be particularly useful in the context of a responsibility-sensitive
egalitarian approach.  It can throw a new light on the discussions about Dworkin’s cut and
inform us about the social acceptance of various criteria for compensation.  In the
relativistic approach of Roemer (1993) it seems even indispensable.  Moreover, we can
derive from it some information on social priorities in the case where different axioms are
conflicting.  This may guide the choice of a concrete distribution rule.
While a large part of the psychological and sociological literature is too far removed from
the normative discussion to be immediately useful for economists, some research by
psychologists and sociologists is in close spirit with responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism
(Miller, 1992).  This is also illustrated by the work of Konow (1996): this author derives a
“positive” theory of fairness, based mainly on the results of questionnaire studies and in
which a so-called accountability principle plays a crucial role.  This principle basically
boils down to what we have called responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism and Konow also
makes a distinction between “discretionary” variables and variables which are beyond the
control of the individuals.  However, he does not refer in any way to the social choice
literature.  We have constructed a questionnaire which is based explicitly on the
theoretical work.  The results of a partial pretesting with Belgian students, on which we
reported in Schokkaert and Devooght (1998) were quite promising, both with respect to
the quality of the questionnaire and with respect to the acceptance of the responsibility-
sensitive compensation framework.  In this paper we report on a broader study, where an
improved and extended version of the questionnaire was submitted to first-year university
students in Belgium, Burkina Faso and Indonesia.  This brings in the intercultural
dimension.
Our questions are mainly situated within the quasi-linear model of Bossert (1995) and
Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996).  We interpret this model both in the context of income
redistribution and in the context of subsidies for health expenditures.  Its most important
4features are summarised in section 2, where we also discuss our way of concretizing
Dworkin’s cut.  Section 3 sketches the empirical setting of our study and the contents of
the questionnaire.  The empirical results are described in section 4.  We first discuss the
location of Dworkin’s cut in the three countries considered and we then go deeper into the
degree of acceptance of the different axioms and distributional rules.  We finally focus on
the intercultural differences concerning the Pareto-principle.  Section 5 concludes.
2.  RESPONSIBILITY AND EGALITARIANISM
Let us first consider a model of income redistribution (Bossert and Fleurbaey, 1996).
Assume there are n individuals in society, each characterised by a vector of individual
characteristics ai
m∈ℜ , determining their pre-tax income f ai( ).   A characteristics
profile is a a an
nm
= ∈ℜ( ,..., ) .1   The problem is to define an optimal redistribution
mechanism, which gives for each possible characteristics profile a vector of post-tax
income levels F a( ) , such that the following budget constraint is satisfied:
(1)          F a f ai
i
n
i
i
n
( ) ( )
= =
 = 
1 1
Eq. (1) implies that the redistribution does not lead to an efficiency loss, i.e. that we are
considering a first-best problem.
A pure and simple income egalitarian would go for the solution F a
n
f a ii i
i
n
( ) ( ),=  ∀
=
1
1
.
A responsibility-sensitive egalitarian, however, will point to the possibility that a subset of
the characteristics ai  are within the responsibility of individual i.  Her first problem -
locating Dworkin’s cut- then becomes how to partition the vector ai  in ( , )a ai
R
i
C , where
ai
R r∈ℜ  is a vector of “responsibility”-variables and aiC c∈ℜ  a vector of
“compensation” variables (with r c m+ = ).  We mentioned already in the introduction
that there is in the literature a lively discussion about this partitioning, featuring mainly
two basic approaches.  The first approach emphasizes that what matters is the degree of
control: people are responsible for these characteristics which result from their own
voluntary choice.  They have to be compensated for these characteristics which are
beyond their control.  The second approach defines responsibility by delegation: we feel
responsible (and are to be held responsible) for those characteristics which define our
identity, whether they are under our control or not.  The concrete way in which we tried to
concretise these subtle philosophical distinctions in our empirical work will be discussed
in the following section.  Let us now for the sake of the argument accept that a decision on
the partitioning has been taken.  The second problem is then how this partitioning can be
exploited to give a concrete content to the idea of responsibility-sensitivity.
5Fleurbaey (1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1998) has modelled two basic intuitions in this respect.
We give a brief and mathematically loose summary1.  The first intuition refers to
compensation and basically reflects the egalitarian aspect of the approach.  We will call it
full compensation and it states that for all possible a , for any two individuals, one should
have
(2)          a a F a F ai
R
j
R
i j=  =( ) ( )
If two persons are identical on all characteristics for which they can be held responsible -if
they only differ with respect to characteristics for which they must be compensated- then
the redistribution mechanism must assign these two persons the same post-tax income.
The second intuition captures the idea of responsibility, i.e. of the boundaries to be
imposed on egalitarianism.  We call it strict compensation and it says that for all possible
a , for any two individuals, the redistribution mechanism must satisfy
(3)          a a F a f a F a f ai
C
j
C
i i j j=  − = −( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
If two persons have identical compensation characteristics, the differences in their pre-tax
income will only reflect differences in their responsibility characteristics, and hence there
is no reason why these differences should diminish through the redistribution process.
Eq. (3) formalises this by imposing that these two persons should pay the same tax or
receive the same transfer.
The main result of Fleurbaey is that the two intuitions of full compensation and strict
compensation are in general incompatible if n ≥ 4 .  In the context of the quasi-linear
income redistribution model, there will only be a redistribution rule satisfying (2) and (3)
for all possible a , if f ai( )  is additively separable in ai
C  and ai
R , i.e. if
(4)          f a g a h ai i
R
i
C( ) ( ) ( )= +
in which case a natural redistribution mechanism is F 0 , assigning to individual k the
post-tax income
(5)          F a g a
n
h ak k
R
i
C
i
n0
1
1
( ) ( ) ( )= + 
=
If f ai( )  is not additively separable, it is impossible to satisfy full and strict compensation
at the same time.  Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) describe several distribution mechanisms
which satisfy a combination of one axiom with weakened versions of the other.
                                                          
1 Fleurbaey and other authors give a host of different axioms and variants of axioms to model these basic
intuitions.  We only focus on the simplest (and most direct) formulations.  See Fleurbaey (1998) for a more
complete overview.
6Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) set their problem in the context of income (re)distribution.
Because we wanted to test the social acceptance of the intuitions of full and strict
compensation in different settings, we also propose an alternative interpretation for the
case of health care financing.  The function f a ai
R
i
C( , )  then gives the medical
expenditures of individual i, determined as before by variables for which she is
responsible and variables for which she must be compensated.  The compensation takes
place through a vector of individual subsidies ( ( ),..., ( ))ω ω1 a an , the sum of which is
equal to a fixed amount ω .  Since all medical expenditures have to be covered, there is an
overall budget constraint
(6)          f a a c ai
R
i
C
i
i
n
i
n
( , ) ( )= + 
==
ω
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where
(7)          c a f a a ai i
R
i
C
i( ) ( , ) ( )= −ω
is the own financial contribution (net of subsidies) of individual i.  Full compensation
(egalitarianism) then implies that two persons with the same value for the responsibility
characteristics should pay the same own contribution, i.e.
(8)         a a c a c ai
R
j
R
i j=  =( ) ( )
Strict compensation implies that two persons with the same value for the compensation
characteristics should get the same subsidy:
(9)          a a a ai
C
j
C
i j=  =ω ω( ) ( )
Equation (9) captures the idea of responsibility-sensitivity, as it implies that differences in
medical expenditures following from differences in responsibility-characteristics will be
fully reflected in differences in the own contributions.  All the redistribution mechanisms
defined for the income case can easily be reformulated for the health expenditures-
interpretation2.
Both problems summarised in this section raise many empirical questions.  First, what do
people think about the partitioning of the vector ai ?  Do they accept that control is the
crucial factor?  Second, do they accept the general idea of responsibility-sensitive
egalitarianism?  Do they feel that full compensation is acceptable?  Do they endorse
Fleurbaey’s intuitions about responsibility, as captured by the idea of strict compensation?
Would they pick distribution mechanism (5) in the additively separable case?  To what
axiom do they give priority if the basic intuitions of full and strict compensation are
incompatible?  And, in general, are there intercultural differences in these opinions?  Is
                                                          
2 An application of this approach to the real-world problem of risk adjustment in managed health care
markets can be found in Schokkaert, Dhaene and Van de Voorde (1998).
7there empirical ground for Roemer’s cultural relativism?  In this paper we want to give a
first and preliminary answer to these questions.
3.  THE EMPIRICAL SETTING
To explore the intercultural dimension of the problem, we organised a questionnaire study
in three countries on three different continents: Belgium, Burkina Faso and Indonesia.  In
all three cases there were two different questionnaires, one on income distribution and one
on health care expenditures.  These were distributed in a random way and were completed
anonymously by first-year university students in an economics class.  None of these
students had been exposed to any teaching on formal theories of justice.  More detailed
information on the samples is given in Table 1.  We opted for students samples, not only
because students are readily available: the fact that the study was organised at a university
also gave us the opportunity to let it administer by former colleagues who were well
aware of its purpose and its methodological requirements.  They also helped with the
translation of the questions.  Moreover, by concentrating on students we could control for
much interindividual variation in personal characteristics (such as age and schooling).
This gives us a better basis to interpret the remaining differences between the samples as
resulting from differences in national (or cultural) background.
Table 1.  Information about samples
BELGIUM BURKINA FASO INDONESIA
University of Leuven, Faculty of
Business
University of Ouagadougou,
Faculty of Law
University of Bandung, Faculty
of Business
April 1996 May 1996 August 1997
Income: N=84
Health: N=94
Income: N=90
Health: N=87
Income: N=203
Health: N=200
The questionnaire consisted of three parts3.  In the first part, we wanted to get a better
insight into the perception of Dworkin’s cut.  We therefore used a methodology which
was already used (among others) by Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984), Schokkaert and Overlaet
(1988) and Schokkaert and Capéau (1991).  Respondents were confronted with a series of
simple two-person cases where the two persons differed in only one characteristic.  The
respondents could pick from a list of possibilities the distribution or redistribution that
they considered as “just”.  If they wanted, they could add another preferred
(re)distribution.  These distributions were presented as vectors, without explicit currency
units or references to living standards or welfare levels.
                                                          
3 The complete formulation of the first two parts of the questionnaire and the questions concerning the
Pareto-principle (from the third part) are given in the appendix.
8Table 2.  Overview of cases
HEALTH
PREFERENCES RESOURCES
CONTROLLED
Mark opts for a private room
because it is more comfortable
Mark’s treatment is more
expensive because he is a
confirmed smoker
INVOLUNTARY
Mark opts for a private room
because he has psychological
problems in the presence of
other people
Mark’s treatment is more
expensive because he has a
genetic defect and his natural
resistance is weaker
INCOME
PREFERENCES RESOURCES
CONTROLLED
Elisabeth chooses to work
harder and to take less leisure
time
Elisabeth is more productive
because she has chosen to
develop better skills in the past
INVOLUNTARY
Elisabeth works harder because
she has been brought up in a
hard working family
Elisabeth is more productive
because she has a higher natural
intelligence
With our choice of variants we tried to capture a bit of the abstract philosophical
discussion on Dworkin’s cut.  It is not easy, however, to define concrete variables for the
idea of “personal identity-related” characteristics.  We therefore started from Dworkin’s
(1981) suggestion to consider individual preferences as the basic characteristic defining
the individual identities.  Combining the different possibilities we finally constructed four
cases for both the health and the income variant.  Our choices are summarised in table 2.
In principle we would expect a small degree of compensation for the CP-variables
(“controlled preferences” or expensive tastes) and a large degree of compensation for the
IR-variables (“involuntary resources”) where both philosophical approaches take the same
stance.  However, it is very well possible that some of our respondents take another
position, either because they do not follow the philosophical a priori’s or because our
translation in terms of concrete variables is inadequate.  This first part of the questionnaire
also allowed for some “learning-by-doing”, making it possible to formulate more
complicated cases in the second part.
9In that second part we varied the description of the hypothetical persons in the cases along
two dimensions, one which we considered to be a responsibility-variable (the CP-boxes in
table 2: choice of a private room and effort respectively), one which we took as a
compensation-variable (the variables in the IR-boxes: genetic defects and innate
intelligence respectively).  The description in case A of the pre-tax incomes or the medical
expenditures (see appendix) is based on the following specification of f:
(10)          f a a ai i
C
i
R( ) = + +150 50 150
In this additively separable case, it is possible for the respondents to pick the distribution
rule (5), satisfying both full and strict compensation.  Case B is similar to case A, but the
function f is no longer additively separable in the aC  and a R -variables:
(11)          f a a a a ai i
C
i
R
i
R
i
C( ) = + + +200 200 150 100
This means that the respondents have to choose a compromise between the basic
“egalitarian” and “responsibility”-intuitions.
Following the approach proposed by Amiel and Cowell (1992), we added a series of
verbal questions, where the respondents were confronted with the basic axioms
formulated in plain language.  They simply had to report whether they agreed with the
statement or not.  Afterwards, they were given the opportunity to change their answers on
the numerical cases, if they had the feeling that there was an inconsistency between their
answers on the numerical and the verbal parts.  If they were inconsistent, but did not want
to alter any of their answers, they were asked to explain the argumentation behind their
choices.
The third part of the questionnaire (which was identical for the “health” and “income”
versions) tested for the acceptance of some other common axioms from the social choice
literature, such as the no-envy principle, the stand-alone-upper-bound, the unanimity-
lower-bound, population and resource monotonicity.  In this paper we will not comment
upon the results in this latter part.  We will only report some results on the acceptance of
the Pareto-principle because they shed some light on the results of the first two parts.
4.  RESULTS
We look first at the results of the simple cases indicating the degree of acceptance of
different criteria for compensation.  This will give already a first indication of the
acceptance of Fleurbaey’s axioms.  In a second subsection we deal explicitly with this
latter point and we focus upon the distributive mechanism chosen by our respondents in
the more complex bidimensional setting.  We close with some striking results on the
Pareto-principle.
4.1. Dworkin’s cut: the limits of responsibility
The detailed results for the different cases are given in the appendix.  A summary of the
most important results can be found in Table 3.  In that table the answers of the
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respondents are grouped into four categories.  “No compensation” refers to the case
where the differentiating characteristic is treated as a “responsibility”-variable and the
respondent subscribes to the notion of strict compensation: this leads to an equal
distribution of the subsidy in the health case (ω ωi j= ) and to the status quo-solution (no
taxes or transfers) in the income-case.  “Full compensation” means that the respondent
treats the characteristic as a “compensation”-variable and applies axioms (2) or (8): he has
opted for equality of post-tax incomes in the income-case and for equality of the own
contributions in the health case.  If the respondent gives a larger subsidy to the person
with higher medical expenditures or transfers some income from the person with a high
pre-tax income to the person with a low pre-tax income, but without going for complete
equality, we say that she has opted for “intermediate compensation”.  If she goes in the
opposite direction -a smaller subsidy for higher medical expenditures or a positive tax on
the low-income person- we define her position as “countercompensation”.  Table 3 is still
further summarised in table 4, giving the proportion of respondents in the complete
sample that want to compensate, i.e. the first two rows of the subtables 3.
Table 3.  Criteria for compensation
Health case 1: private room (CP)
BELGIUM BURKINA FASO INDONESIA
Full compensation 0.0 1.1 0.0
Intermediate
compensation
37.6 26.4 30.9
No compensation 60.2 67.8 63.3
Countercompensation 2.2 4.7 5.8
Health case 2: private room because of psychological problems (IP)
BELGIUM BURKINA FASO INDONESIA
Full compensation 6.4 9.3 5.7
Intermediate
compensation
73.4 68.6 62.0
No compensation 18.1 19.8 28.1
Countercompensation 2.1 2.3 4.2
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Health case 3: smoker (CR)
BELGIUM BURKINA FASO INDONESIA
Full compensation 3.2 2.3 6.1
Intermediate
compensation
37.2 34.9 38.5
No compensation 45.7 45.3 39.0
Countercompensation 13.9 17.5 16.4
Health case 4: genetic defects (IR)
BELGIUM BURKINA FASO INDONESIA
Full compensation 28.7 25.6 28.4
Intermediate
compensation
64.9 59.3 52.1
No compensation 5.3 11.6 16.0
Countercompensation 1.1 2.5 3.6
Income case 1: effort CP)
BELGIUM BURKINA FASO INDONESIA
Full compensation 6.1 7.8 9.4
Intermediate
compensation
1.2 6.6 0.0
No compensation 69.5 30.0 53.3
Countercompensation 23.2 55.6 37.2
12
Income case 2: hard working family (IP)
BELGIUM BURKINA FASO INDONESIA
Full compensation 9.8 14.4 12.4
Intermediate
compensation
0.0 1.1 0.0
No compensation 70.7 32.2 57.1
Countercompensation 19.5 52.3 30.5
Income case 3: acquired skills (CR)
BELGIUM BURKINA FASO INDONESIA
Full compensation 4.9 10.0 12.1
Intermediate
compensation
0.0 1.1 0.0
No compensation 59.3 32.2 52.0
Countercompensation 35.8 56.7 35.9
Income case 4: innate intelligence (IR)
BELGIUM BURKINA FASO INDONESIA
Full compensation 59.8 41.1 46.5
Intermediate
compensation
1.2 1.1 1.8
No compensation 34.1 28.9 37.8
Countercompensation 4.9 28.9 13.9
Table 4 gives us a general idea about the location of Dworkin’s cut.  Because the
Indonesian sample is larger than the two others, the results in the table are somewhat
“biased” in that direction but, as we will discuss later on, the results in table 3 suggest that
the intercountry differences are not so large as to make the averaging meaningless.
Look at the health-case first.  It is clear that both philosophical approaches are to a certain
degree supported by our results.  Both for preferences and resources the row-element
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corresponding to “involuntary” is larger than the corresponding “controlled” element.
Both for controlled and involuntary characteristics the “resources” column is larger than
the “preferences”-column.  On the other hand -and always taking into account that our
choice of concrete variables is open for discussion- they are both to a certain extent
rejected.  About one third of the respondents does compensate for expensive tastes, 42%
compensates for “controlled resources” and even 73% compensates for “involuntary
preferences”.  In general, the overall degree of compensation is rather high in the health-
cases.
Table 4.  Dworkin’s cut: % of respondents who want to compensate
HEALTH
PREFERENCES RESOURCES
CONTROLLED 31.8 41.9
INVOLUNTARY 73.1 84.8
INCOME
PREFERENCES RESOURCES
CONTROLLED 10.2 10.2
INVOLUNTARY 12.6 49.7
This is much less true in the income-cases.  Differences in effort are definitely seen as a
“responsibility”-factor, even if they follow from the (involuntarily “chosen”) family
background (IP) or are situated in the past (CR).  This effect is so strong that it becomes
difficult to draw any conclusions about Dworkin’s cut in this case.  In fact, redistribution
of labour income is much less popular than compensation for differences in health care
needs.  Even innate intelligence is only compensated for by about 50% of the respondents.
If one were willing to base some conclusions about Dworkin’s cut on the cells IP and CR
in table 4 (because there the predictions of both philosophical approaches differ), one
could say that there is somewhat more support for the Arneson/Cohen than for the
Dworkin/Scanlon-view.  However, it is clear that we have to be very cautious with this
interpretation.  Our concrete cases are but an extremely primitive reflection of the subtle
philosophical distinctions.  This is the more true because our focus on the preferences/
resources distinction is only one way to give content to the broader idea of responsibility
by delegation, as defined by Scanlon.  Almost any concrete interpretation of Dworkin’s
cut is justifiable within his broader contractualist approach.  Of course, this also means
that empirical results as the ones we present may be particularly useful to give a concrete
content to this approach.
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The more detailed results in Table 3 give us some interesting additional insights in the
way our respondents think about compensation.  It is immediately obvious that they reject
some important starting points of the economic theory of responsibility-sensitive
egalitarianism.  Look at the health cases first.  Respondents, who are willing to
compensate, have a clear preference for the so-called intermediate solutions.  These
solutions do not fit easily into the Fleurbaey-framework.  More specifically, it seems that
the axiom of full compensation, i.e. the basic idea of egalitarianism, is quite decisively
rejected in these cases.  This is even true in case 4, which relates to genetic defects.
Although our formulation did not refer to health insurance, apparently our respondents use
a notion of coinsurance.  This is much less true in the income-distribution cases, where
the possibility of intermediate compensation is hardly chosen.
However, the income distribution cases 1, 2 and 3 show another feature which does not fit
into the economic theories of equality of opportunity: a large proportion of respondents
chooses a solution with “countercompensation”.  This can be seen as a rejection of the
axiom of strict compensation.  This axiom basically accepts the existence of a kind of
“natural reward” scheme, which should not be interfered with through government
intervention.  Responsibility considerations then act as a constraint on egalitarianism, as a
kind of protection of individual freedom.  However, a large fraction of our respondents
broaden this individualistic notion of responsibility.  In their opinion individuals have
duties and should in a certain sense be “punished” if they do not perform these duties.
The government should not only keep intact income differences following from
differences in effort- it should punish the lazy, whatever the cause of their laziness.  This
attitude -of enforcing certain kinds of behaviour and discouraging other forms- is
corroborated by the results in health case 3 with respect to compensation for smokers.
Here also there is a significant minority who opts for countercompensation.  There can be
no doubt that a fraction of our respondents does not accept the liberal notion of freedom,
or, more specifically, rejects the idea of a “natural reward”-scheme.
This latter point is especially true for the Burkinese sample -the Burkinese students
definitely think that the lazy should be punished.  The acceptance of the liberal notion of
freedom is strongest in Belgium.  This brings us to the point of the intercultural
differences.  The overall picture with respect to Dworkin’s cut is quite similar in the three
samples.  Perhaps the Belgian sample is more inclined than the other two to compensate
for differences in genetic endowments (health and income distribution case 4).  Moreover,
Belgian students apparently take a more favourable attitude towards compensation in the
health cases.  Yet in general it seems fair to say, that apart from the attitude towards
countercompensation in Burkina Faso, intercultural differences are much less pronounced
than could have been expected.  This is a striking result, although it should be interpreted
with caution.  In each country we have focused on a specific and rather homogeneous
subset of the population: the university students.  It is quite plausible that there would be
bigger differences with representative samples of the respective populations- although this
could then be seen as an indication that economic factors are more influential than so-
called cultural differences.  Moreover, we will show in section 4.2 that the intercultural
differences get stronger, when we turn to a more complex setting.
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4.2. Distributive mechanisms: full and strict compensation
With the previous results in mind we can now turn to the more complicated bidimensional
cases.  Complete results are shown in the appendix.  The results with respect to the
concrete axioms (2) or (8) and (3) or (9) are summarised in tables 5 and 6 for the health
cases and the income distribution cases respectively.  We have seen already that
“intermediate” compensation is more popular than full compensation, and that in many
instances respondents advocate a kind of “countercompensation”, which does not fit
easily into the theory.  Therefore we cannot expect that the majority of our respondents
opts for the solutions proposed in the literature -including the natural solution (5) in the
separable case.
Let us look first at the results for health case A.  The first column for Belgium gives the
results for the numerical case in the obvious interpretation, in which “choosing a private
room” is a responsibility-variable and “lower natural resistance” a compensation-variable.
These results are very similar to the ones we reported for another sample of Belgian
students in Schokkaert and Devooght (1998).  Somewhat surprisingly, more than 56% of
the students chooses the “natural solution” (5).  After all, although this solution may be
natural from a theoretical point of view, it is much less so for our respondents who do not
reason from a complete theoretical background.  In fact, at first sight it is much less
natural than the equal or proportional solutions which are also among the possibilities.  In
our previous paper we concluded from this result that the compensation framework seems
to be rather close to the moral intuitions of our respondents in the health case.  However,
the present study gives additional material which is much less encouraging.
Table 5.  Distribution rules and acceptance of axioms: health cases
CASE A BELGIUM BURKINA FASO INDONESIA
Num Adju Verb Num Adju Verb Num Adju Verb
Full, strict 56.4 31.9 17.0 31.0 23.8 31.0 41.0 26.7 24.2
Full, not strict 10.7 4.4 28.7 12.6 7.5 10.4 14.0 4.7 13.6
Not full, strict 6.4 5.5 28.7 11.6 7.5 29.9 16.5 12.2 34.9
Not full, not strict 26.5 58.2 25.6 44.8 61.3 28.7 28.5 56.4 27.3
CASE B BELGIUM BURKINA FASO INDONESIA
Num Adju Verb Num Adju Verb Num Adju Verb
Full, strict - - 17.0 - - 31.0 - - 24.2
Full, not strict 25.6 13.2 28.7 17.4 11.3 10.4 16.4 6.4 13.6
Not full, strict 46.8 31.9 28.7 61.7 43.8 29.9 70.2 49.4 34.9
Not full, not strict 27.6 54.9 25.6 20.9 45.0 28.7 13.4 44.2 27.3
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In the first place, although the “natural” solution is also the most popular solution in the
Burkinese and Indonesian sample, in these cases only a minority opts for it.  In the second
place, and perhaps more importantly, we know from the previous section that not all the
respondents see the choice of a private room as a “responsibility” variable (or a genetic
defect as a reason for compensation).  It seems therefore necessary to reinterpret the
answers of the respondents on the more complicated cases in the light of their positions in
the simple cases.  To give an example: someone, who interprets both the choice of a
private room and the presence of a genetic defect as compensation variables will only
accept full compensation if he goes for complete equality of the own contributions of the
individuals in the case.  Someone who interprets both characteristics as responsibility
variables will only be consistent with the axiom of strict compensation if he opts for the
equal distribution of the subsidies.  Reinterpreting the answers of the respondents in the
light of their own personal perception of compensation- and responsibility-variables gives
the numbers in the second column (“adjusted”).  The differences between the different
samples become smaller and so does the degree of acceptance of the axioms.  This is
exactly what could be expected on the basis of the results in Table 3.  Remember that this
table already showed that intermediate compensation is much more popular than full
compensation.  In the third place, the answers on the verbal questions (in the third
column) show a mixed picture.  Averaging over the three samples, about 40% of the
respondents accepts the egalitarian idea that “people who take the same decisions
concerning their room in the hospital should bear the same amount of medical expenses”.
A much larger group (60% in Burkina Faso and Indonesia, 45% in Belgium) thinks that
“the government has to pay an equal subsidy to all people with the same genetic
characteristics”, our formulation of strict compensation4.
The pattern of chosen distribution rules (see appendix) is also mixed.  A large fraction of
the Burkinese students chooses the proportional solution.  The egalitarian solution, in
which everybody pays the same own contribution, is hardly taken.  Much more popular
(certainly in Indonesia) is the so-called “status quo”-position.  The terminology “status
quo” may be somewhat confusing in the health cases: in fact, in a certain sense this is also
an “egalitarian” solution, in which the subsidy is distributed equally over the four
individuals without any correction for differences in needs.  It is not surprising that this
easy solution acts as a kind of focal point.
Results are even more mixed in the non-separable health case B.  If respondents are
forced to choose between full and strict compensation, the former axiom obviously (and
not surprisingly) is given up.  Both in Burkina Faso and in Indonesia the axiom of strict
compensation is even more often satisfied in case B than in case A.  Perhaps it acts as a
kind of anchoring principle, used by the respondents to structure a case of a bewildering
complexity.  This latter consideration may also explain why the most popular choice in all
three countries is the distribution of the subsidy like in the natural solution of the
separable case A (which we call the “natural solution look-alike”).  In case B, this
distribution does satisfy strict compensation (but not full compensation).  It is very well
possible that respondents simply stuck to the choice they made previously in case A
(without realising the different consequences in both cases).  However, it is also possible
                                                          
4 The exact formulation of the questions can be found in the appendix.
17
that this distribution of the subsidies looks attractive, irrespective of the satisfaction of the
axioms.  Given the results in table 3, one could expect that many respondents would pick
a solution which satisfies strict and intermediate (instead of full) compensation.  This
pattern is indeed present in many of the chosen distribution rules.
Let us now turn to the results for the income distribution problem (Table 6 and
Appendix).  Here, the differences between cases A and B are less revealing than the
differences between the different countries.  Some of the intercultural differences which
were present in a weak form in the simple questions of section 4.2 reappear here in a
considerably strengthened fashion.  The pattern which seems to emerge can be
summarised with three observations.
Table 6.  Distribution rules and acceptance of axioms: income distribution cases
CASE A BELGIUM BURKINA FASO INDONESIA
Num Adju Verb Num Adju Verb Num Adju Verb
Full, strict 29.8 29.5 6.0 13.3 9.1 33.3 9.8 6.4 13.3
Full, not strict 2.4 3.3 34.5 6.7 9.1 21.1 1.5 1.0 20.7
Not full, strict 13.1 14.7 8.3 16.7 30.3 14.4 28.6 44.7 24.6
Not full, not strict 54.7 52.5 51.2 63.3 51.5 31.1 60.1 47.9 41.4
CASE B BELGIUM BURKINA FASO INDONESIA
Num Adju Verb Num Adju Verb Num Adju Verb
Full, strict - - 6.0 - - 33.3 - - 13.3
Full, not strict 25.3 21.3 34.5 10.0 9.1 21.1 3.5 2.1 20.7
Not full, strict 24.1 23.0 8.3 34.4 36.4 14.4 38.4 47.9 24.6
Not full, not strict 50.6 55.7 51.2 55.6 54.5 31.1 58.1 50.0 41.4
First, as in the health case, pure and simple income egalitarianism is chosen by only an
extremely small minority in all three countries.  A considerably larger group of
respondents select the status-quo solution, i.e. no redistribution at all.  Although this
conservative choice occurs less often in Belgium, it is rather popular in Burkina Faso and
still more in Indonesia, where both in the separable and the non-separable case more than
18
25% of the respondents select it.  We find the more redistribution-oriented state of mind
of the Belgian respondents also in other parts of the questionnaire.
Second, in the numerical questions full compensation with respect to differences in innate
capacities is a real option for respondents in Belgium only.  In fact, while the natural
solution (5) is the most popular choice in case A for Belgium, it is not dominant at all in
Burkina Faso and Indonesia.  Even in Belgium, only about 30% of the respondents
chooses this distribution rule- this is about the same proportion as was found in the
adjusted results of the health case5.  The answers on the verbal questions suggest a
different pattern, with a large acceptance of full compensation in Burkina Faso.  It is
instructive, however, to look at the exact formulation of the question: “Do you think that
people who perform the same effort should claim an equal income?”  This formulation
does not contain any reference to the non-effort related variables (which implicitly are
compensated for when one accepts the statement), while at the same time mentioning
explicitly the effort-dimension.  Respondents may have reacted to the latter clue-
implicitly assuming that “an equal income for equal effort” would also imply “a different
income for a different effort level”.
This latter interpretation is certainly in line with the third observation: many respondents
prefer countercompensation (where effort is rewarded and laziness punished), and slightly
more so in Burkina Faso and Indonesia than in Belgium.  This finding is consistent with
the results for the simple cases in table 3.  In our opinion, this is a striking result6.  The
idea of a “duty towards the community” plays a crucial role in the justice conception of
many respondents- in all cultures.  This idea certainly goes strongly against the traditional
liberal conceptions of justice.
We can summarize.  The axiom of full compensation is in general much less accepted
than the axiom of strict compensation.  Intermediate compensation schemes are more
popular in the health cases; the income distribution problem is even dominated by the idea
of countercompensation.  Belgian respondents are more oriented towards compensation in
the health cases, and more redistribution-oriented in the income cases.  The Indonesian
respondents are the most conservative in favouring the status-quo option.  Burkinese
students take an intermediate position.
It would be interesting to know where these differences come from.  They can reflect
genuine differences in opinions about justice or point to different attitudes towards
conflict.  Once one starts to compensate, one has to form an opinion about the degree of
compensation and about the variables to be compensated for.  One cannot expect to reach
easily a social consensus about these questions -as our survey results convincingly show.
By choosing what we have called the “status-quo” option, respondents avoid this difficult
                                                          
5 In Schokkaert and Devooght (1998), there was a significant discrepancy between the answers in health
case A and income distribution case A.  The present results show that this was probably due to the use of an
a priori-classification of responsibility- and compensation-variables.  Compare the “adjusted” columns for
Belgium in table 5A and table 6A.
6 At the time of the pretesting about which we report in Schokkaert and Devooght (1998), we did not add
countercompensation as one of the options among which respondents could choose- simply because we did
not think about the possibility.  Like in the present study, however, respondents could add a preferred
distribution of their own to the list we proposed.  A significant group of respondents explicitly added
countercompensating redistributions in the income distribution problem.  This is the reason why we included
them in the present version of the questionnaire.
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debate.  No redistribution in the income case and an equal division of the subsidy (which
has to be divided in one way or another) in the health case are conflict-avoiding choices.
Different attitudes towards justice or towards conflict-avoidance can be a reflection of
intercultural differences.  However, differences in the social background of our
respondents can also be part of the explanation.  The Indonesian university of Bandung
recruits its students mainly among Catholics of Chinese origin- and it is well known that
this is the most entrepreneurially oriented segment of the Indonesian population.
There is even a more immediate explanation possible.  Belgian students live in a society
with a solidaristic compulsory and universal health insurance system  and with a highly
redistributive income tax.  Their answers on the concrete questions could therefore simply
reflect to some extent the socio-economic institutions they are acquainted with.  If this
hypothesis were true, the differences would tend to disappear with more abstract and less
institution-oriented formulations.  This was already partly the case in the simple questions
discussed in section 4.1.  In the next section, we turn to an even more abstract problem.  It
will turn out that not all intercultural differences disappear.
4.3.  The Pareto-principle
The third part of the questionnaire contained some questions which were designed to
check general ideas about equality and to test for the acceptance of the Pareto-principle.  It
is worthwhile giving the complete formulation.  First, respondents had to answer the
following question:
Suppose that a certain amount of food is distributed between some persons.  You
can dispose of an additional amount of food but this amount can or may only be
allocated to one person.  This person therefore will get a greater amount of food.
All the other persons will keep their former amounts and thus get nothing less.  Do
you find this possible distribution an improvement in comparison with the original
distribution?
Those who answered “yes” to this question were confronted with the following problem:
Suppose now that this additional amount of food necessarily has to be allocated to
the person who already has the greatest amount in the original distribution.  The
richest will become richer but no one of the other persons will be worse off.  Do
you find that, in this special case, the new distribution is still an improvement in
comparison with the original distribution?
If the answer on the first question was “no”, the follow up-question read as follows:
Suppose now that this additional amount of food necessarily has to be allocated to
the person who has the smallest amount in the original distribution.  The poorest
will improve his situation but no one of the other persons will be worse off.  Do
you find that, in this special case, the new distribution is still worse than the
original distribution?
The answers on these questions are summarised in table 7.  The sum of the elements in
the first two rows gives the percentage of respondents who answered “yes” on the first
question, i.e. who basically think that an increase in the total amount of food to be
distributed is a “good thing”, even if it is only to the benefit of one person.  About 50% of
the Belgian respondents and 42% of the Burkinese students have chosen this answer.  The
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corresponding figure for the Indonesian sample is 85%!  The difference persists when we
also bring the second question into the analysis.  Note that only the respondents who
answered “yes” on both questions do accept the Pareto-principle as it is usually
interpreted in economic theory.  This sacrosanct principle is very decisively rejected by
our Belgian and Burkinese samples.  This is a confirmation of previous empirical results,
reported inter alia by McClelland and Rohrbaugh (1978) and Amiel and Cowell (1994).
More surprising in the light of this previous work- but more in line with economic theory-
is the acceptance of the Pareto principle by a majority of our Indonesian sample.  Of those
who answered “no” on the first question, the vast majority in Belgium and Burkina Faso
changes his mind when it is made explicit that the advantage goes to the poorest; this is
not the case in Indonesia, however.  The conclusion that our Indonesian sample cares less
about redistribution seems to rest on very firm ground.  On the basis of this study, it is
difficult to judge whether this is due to intercultural differences or to their specific socio-
economic background.  However, the persistence of the differences with the abstract
formulations in this section, makes it much less plausible that the variation described in
section 4.2 can be explained completely by the fact that respondents are influenced by the
concrete health insurance or fiscal system of their country.
Table 7.  Acceptance of the Pareto-principle
BELGIUM BURKINA FASO INDONESIA
YY: acceptance of the
Pareto-criterion
20.9 18.2 62.6
YN: “efficiency gain”
is OK, but not if it goes
to the richest person
29.4 23.8 21.7
NN: “efficiency gain”
is OK, if it goes to the
poorest person
38.4 43.8 4.2
NY: change in the
distribution is not
acceptable
11.3 14.2 11.5
5.  CONCLUSION
Formal models of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism bridge part of the gap between
traditional welfarism economics and more modern non-welfarist philosophical ideas.
They also offer an opportunity to confront formal economic theory with the actual
political and social debate, in which the notion of “responsibility” plays an essential role.
We have discussed some empirical results which can help to understand better the
implications and limitations of this approach.
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A first problem is the one of “locating Dworkin’s cut”, i.e. to draw the line between
variables for which individuals have to be compensated and variables for which they are
held responsible.  Empirical research is crucial to solve this problem within a
contractualist or a culturally relativist approach (as the one defended by Scanlon and
Roemer respectively).  Our results for Belgium, Burkina Faso and Indonesia suggest that
cultural differences are not so large as could have been expected a priori.  We find some
support for the notion that individuals are responsible for the preferences with which they
identify and -more strongly- for the idea that they are responsible for the variables which
are under their control.  However, none of these two stylised approaches can count on a
consensus among our respondents.
In the second place some of the answers of our respondents raise basic questions
concerning the starting points of the approach.  In many of our cases, the notion of
egalitarianism itself is rejected in favour of what we called “intermediate compensation”:
this is an inequality-reducing intervention, which does not go the whole way towards
egalitarianism.  Note that this is not due to the presence of responsibility variables,
because these are controlled for in the formulation of the questions.  Moreover, if our
respondents really feel that individuals are responsible for their behaviour (smoking and
working hard are obvious examples) they go further than what responsibility-sensitive
egalitarianism suggests.  For some of our respondents not only should people not be
compensated for the consequences of this behaviour, they should even be punished (if
they smoke or are lazy).  We have called this phenomenon “countercompensation”.  This
very non-liberal attitude is found in all samples, but is most important in the Burkinese
sample.
In the third place, our results corroborate the findings of other authors with respect to the
sacrosanct Pareto-principle.  This principle is scathingly rejected by Belgian and
Burkinese students.  However, it is much more popular in Indonesia.  In general, our
Indonesian sample seems to be more efficiency- and less redistribution-oriented than the
two others.  More research (preferably with larger non-student samples) is necessary to
see whether this result is a reflection of genuine intercultural differences or rather follows
from differences in the socio-economic background of the respondents.
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APPENDIX
This questionnaire will explore some attitudes towards justice and redistribution. We will do this with the help of some
hypothetical cases. We are interested in your insights! Because these cases deal with attitudes, there are no 'right' or
'wrong' answers. Your answers will clarify presuppositions which appear in economic literature and of which we do not
know for sure are true of the population.
This questionnaire has three parts. We ask you to complete part one before you look at the second part. We will ask you
kindly nothing to change in the first part after you have started part two. Your answers should become completely
useless for us and you can not gain or lose anything by changing.  Finally you can complete part three.
This questionnaire is completely anonymous. Do not write your name on this questionnaire. Thank you for your
collaboration.
PART  ONE: HEALTH CASES
In the first part we present some cases in which we ask for your personal preference concerning the distribution of
certain costs. There are no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers.
HEALTH CASE 1
1) Luke and Mark are both suffering similar effects of lung cancer. They have the same financial wealth at their
disposal and earn the same income. Luke and Mark have to be admitted to a hospital for treatment. We suppose that
all treatments are effective. Luke chooses for a common room which he shares with other patients. The costs of his
treatment in the hospital are 250. Mark, on the other hand, opts for a private room in the hospital which gives him
more comfort. Due to his choice of a private room, the costs of  the treatment of Mark are 750. The government has
to divide 500 as a financial contribution to the costs of the treatments of the two persons and is willing to divide it
completely. What would you consider to be a just division of this amount of money? Place an asterisk * in the box of
your choice. In row H you can add an own ideal distribution of the government money.
LUKE MARK
Contribution government
in the costs
Own contribution.
The patient...
Contribution  government
in the costs
Own contribution The
patient...
A 0 pays 250 himself. 500 pays 250 himself.
B 125 pays 125 himself. 375 pays 375 himself.
C 200 pays 50 himself. 300 pays 450 himself.
D 250 pays nothing. 250 pays 500 himself.
E 300 keeps 50. 200 pays 550 himself.
F 375 keeps 125. 125 pays 625 himself.
G 500 keeps 250. 0 pays 750 himself
H
HEALTH CASE 1  (%) Answer BELGIUM BURKINA FASO INDONESIA
Full Compensation A - 1.1 -
Intermediate compensation B 14.0 18.4 18.3
Intermediate compensation C 23.6 8.0 12.6
No compensation D 60.2 67.8 63.3
Countercompensation E 1.1 1.2 2.6
Countercompensation F 1.1 1.2 1.1
Countercompensation G - 2.3 2.1
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HEALTH CASE 2
2) Luke and Mark are both suffering similar effects of lung cancer. They have the same financial wealth at their
disposal and earn the same income. Luke and Mark have to be admitted to a hospital for treatment. We suppose that
all treatments are effective. Luke chooses for a common room which he shares with other patients. The costs of his
treatment in the hospital are 250. Mark, on the other hand, has psychological problems with the presence of other
people and opts therefore for a private room in the hospital where he is not confronted with other people. Due to his
choice for a private room the costs of the treatment of Mark are 750. The government has to divide 500 as a financial
contribution to the costs of the treatments of the two persons and is willing to divide it completely. What would you
consider to be a just division of this amount of money? Place an asterisk * in the box of your choice. In row H you
can add an own ideal distribution of the government money.
HEALTH CASE 2  (%) Answer BELGIUM BURKINA FASO INDONESIA
Full Compensation A 6.4 9.3 5.7
Intermediate compensation B 46.8 44.2 39.1
Intermediate compensation C 26.6 24.4 22.9
No compensation D 18.1 19.8 28.1
Countercompensation E 1.1 1.2 0.5
Countercompensation F 1.0 1.1 1.1
Countercompensation G - - 2.6
HEALTH CASE 3
3) Luke and Mark are both suffering lung cancer. They have the same financial wealth at their disposal and earn the
same income. Luke and Mark have to be admitted to a hospital for treatment. We suppose that all treatments are
effective. Luke has never been a smoker. The costs of his treatment in the hospital are 250. Mark, on the other hand,
is a confirmed smoker. Due to his smoking behaviour, the effects of lung cancer are more serious than the effects of
lung cancer for Luke. The costs of the treatment of Mark are 750. The government has to divide 500 as a financial
contribution to the costs of the treatments of the two persons and is willing to divide it completely. What would you
consider to be a just division of this amount of money? Place an asterisk * in the box of your choice. In row H you
can add an own ideal distribution of the government money.
HEALTH CASE 3  (%) Answer BELGIUM BURKINA FASO INDONESIA
Full Compensation A 3.2 2.3 6.1
Intermediate compensation B 21.3 18.6 18.0
Intermediate compensation C 15.9 16.3 20.5
No compensation D 45.7 45.3 39.0
Countercompensation E 7.5 5.8 6.2
Countercompensation F 6.4 4.7 3.6
Countercompensation G - 7.0 6.6
HEALTH CASE 4
4) Luke and Mark are both suffering lung cancer. They have the same financial wealth at their disposal and earn the
same income. Luke and Mark have to be admitted to a hospital for treatment. We suppose that all treatments are
effective. Luke is born with a normal natural resistance to lung cancer. The costs of his treatment in the hospital are
250. Mark, on the other hand, has a genetic defect and therefore his natural resistance to lung cancer is much weaker.
The costs of the treatment of Mark are 750. The government has to divide 500 as a financial contribution to the costs
of the treatments of the two persons and is willing to divide it completely. What would you consider to be a just
division of this amount of money? Place an asterisk * in the box of your choice. In row H you can add an own ideal
distribution of the government money.
HEALTH CASE 4  (%) Answer BELGIUM BURKINA FASO INDONESIA
Full Compensation A 28.7 25.6 28.3
Intermediate compensation B 57.5 47.7 36.1
Intermediate compensation C 7.4 11.6 16.0
No compensation D 5.3 11.6 16.0
Countercompensation E - 1.15 2.1
Countercompensation F 1.1 1.15 -
Countercompensation G - 1.15 1.5
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HEALTH CASE A
5) Chris, John, Tim and Tom are suffering from similar effects of lung cancer. The total costs of a successful cure are
350 for Chris, 200 for John, 300 for Tim and 150 for Tom. The total costs are composed as follows. To help Tim and
Tom the costs of the basic cure are 150 each. To help Chris and John the cost for the basic treatment is 200 each, due
to their lower natural resistance against cancer. Chris and John have a genetic defect and therefore need an
additional treatment. This is not necessary for Tim and Tom. There is also a second reason for the differences in
costs. Chris and Tim have chosen a private room in the hospital because it gives them more comfort. This choice
costs them each 150 extra. John and Tom have not chosen such a private room and do not need to pay an additional
cost. We suppose that all treatments are effective. The government has to divide 500 for the treatments between this
patients only and is willing to divide it completely. What would you consider to be a just division of this amount of
money? Place an asterisk "*" in the box at the back of the row you prefer. In row H you can add an own ideal
distribution of the government money.
CHRIS JOHN TIM TOM
Private room
Genetic weak
Common room
Genetic weak
Private room
Genetic strong
Common room
Genetic strong
Contribution
government
in the costs
Own
contribution
Chris pays
Contribution
government
in the costs
Own
contribution
John  pays
Contribution
government
in the costs
Own
contribution
Tim pays
Contribution
government
in the costs
Own
contribution
Tom pays
A 100 250 150 50 100 200 150 0
B 125 225 125 75 125 175 125 25
C 150 200 150 50 100 200 100 50
D 100 250 175 25 75 225 150 0
E 175 175 100 100 150 150 75 75
F 200 150 100 100 150 150 50 100
G 225 125 75 125 175 125 25 125
H
HEALTH CASE A
%
Belgium Burkina Faso Indonesia Axioms
A 4.2 9.2 5.0 - Countercompensation
B 6.4 11.6 16.5 Strict Status quo
C 56.4 31.0 41.0 Strict +  Full Natural solution
D 13.8 10.3 10.0 - Countercompensation
E 4.2 21.8 6.5 - Proportional solution
F 9.6 6.9 13.0 Full Progressive solution
G 1.1 5.7 1.0 Full Egalitarian solution
H 4.3 3.5 7.0 - Solutions of respondents
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HEALTH CASE B
6) Bart, Bert, Hans and Henk are suffering from similar effects of lung cancer. The total costs of a successful cure are
650 for Bart, 400 for Bert, 350 for Hans and 200 for Henk. The total costs are composed as follows. To help Bart and
Bert the costs of a basic cure are 400 each, due to their lower natural resistance to cancer. Bart and Bert have a
genetic defect and need an additional cure. Hans and Henk do not need such an additional cure. To help Hans and
Henk the total costs are 200 each. But there is a second reason for the differences in costs. Bart and Hans have chosen
a private room in the hospital which provides them more comfort. An intensive cure in a private room costs more
than an intensive cure in a normal, common room. Therefore Bart who needs an intensive cure due to his lower
resistance to lung cancer, has to pay 250 extra for his private room. A normal cure in a private room costs also more
but less than an intensive cure in a private room. Hans who has a normal natural resistance, needs no additional cure
and has to pay only 150 extra for his private room. We suppose that all treatments are effective. The government has
to divide 500 for the treatments between this patients only and is willing to divide it completely. What would you
consider to be a just division of this amount of money? Place an asterisk "*" in the box at the back of the row you
prefer. In row K you can add an own ideal distribution of the government money.
BART BERT HANS HENK
Private room
Genetic weak
Common room
Genetic weak
Private room
Genetic strong
Common room
Genetic strong
Contribution
government
in the costs
Own
contribution
Bart pays
Contribution
government
in the costs
Own
contribution
Bert pays
Contribution
government
in the costs
Own
contribution
Hans pays
Contribution
government
in the costs
Own
contribution
Henk pays
A 375 275 125 275 75 275 -75 275
B 225 425 225 175 25 325 25 175
C 275 375 225 175 -25 375 25 175
D 175 475 275 125 -25 375 75 125
E 300 350 200 200 0 350 0 200
F 125 525 125 275 125 225 125 75
G 250 400 250 150 0 350 0 200
H 150 500 150 250 100 250 100 100
I 75 575 175 225 75 275 175 25
J 325 325 125 275 75 275 -25 225
K
HEALTH CASE B
%
Belgium Burkina Faso Indonesia Axioms
A 1.1 7.0 2.5 Full Egalitarian
B 16.0 14.0 21.4 Strict -
C 16.0 5.8 3.5 Full -
D 10.6 9.3 3.5 - -
E 8.5 4.6 10.4 Full -
F 3.2 21.0 19.4 Strict Status quo
G 3.2 2.3 5.5 Strict -
H 20.2 24.4 22.9 Strict Natural solution look-alike
I 2.1 5.8 3.5 - Countercompensation
J 1.1 1.2 - - -
K 13.8 4.6 6.4 - Solutions of respondents
K 4.2 - 1.0 Strict Solutions of respondents
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PART ONE: INCOME REDISTRIBUTION CASES
In the first part we present some cases in which we ask for your personal preference concerning taxes and the
redistribution of incomes. There are no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers.
INCOME REDISTRIBUTION CASE 1
1) Both Elisabeth and Catherine have followed the same education and have the same financial wealth at their
disposal. They are employed in a similar job and are equally intelligent. Elisabeth chooses to work very hard and to
take only little leisure time. Elisabeth receives for her labour an income of 300. Catherine, on the other hand, prefers
to take more leisure time and to work less hours a week than Elisabeth. Catherine receives for her labour an income
of 200. The government wants to redistribute the income. Redistribution does not influence the behaviour of the two
persons. What would you consider to be a just redistribution? Please place an asterisk * in the box of your choice. In
row L you can add an own ideal redistribution.
ELISABETH CATHERINE
Subsidy (+)
or  Tax (-)
Income after
redistribution
Subsidy (+)
or Tax (-)
Income after
redistribution.
A -300 0 +300 500
B -250 50 +250 450
C -200 100 +200 400
D -150 150 +150 350
E -100 200 +100 300
F -50 250 +50 250
G 0 300 0 200
H +50 350 -50 150
I +100 400 -100 100
J +150 450 -150 50
K +200 500 -200 0
L
INCOME CASE 1 (%) Answer BELGIUM BURKINA FASO INDONESIA
Intermediate compensation A - 3.3 -
Intermediate compensation B - - -
Intermediate compensation C - - -
Intermediate compensation D - 1.1 -
Intermediate compensation E 1.2 2.2 -
Full compensation F 6.1 7.8 9.4
No Compensation G 69.5 30.0 53.3
Countercompensation H 20.7 40.0 31.1
Countercompensation I 2.5 10.0 5.0
Countercompensation J - 2.2 1.1
Countercompensation K - 3.4 -
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INCOME REDISTRIBUTION CASE 2
2) Both Elisabeth and Catherine have followed the same education and have the same financial wealth at their
disposal. They are both employed in a similar job and are equally intelligent. Elisabeth has been brought up in a hard
working family. From this background Elisabeth chooses to work very hard and to take only little leisure time.
Elisabeth receives for her labour an income of 300. Catherine, on the other hand,  has been brought up in a family
which attaches less value to labour and effort. In keeping with her background Catherine prefers to take more
leisure time and to work less hours a week than Elisabeth. Catherine receives for her labour an income of 200. The
government wants to redistribute the income. Redistribution does not influence the behaviour of the two persons.
What would you consider to be a just redistribution? Please place an asterisk * in the box of your choice. In row L
you can add an own ideal redistribution.
INCOME CASE 2 (%) Answer BELGIUM BURKINA FASO INDONESIA
Intermediate compensation A - 1.1 -
Intermediate compensation B - - -
Intermediate compensation C - - -
Intermediate compensation D - - -
Intermediate compensation E - - -
Full compensation F 9.8 14.4 12.4
No Compensation G 70.7 32.2 57.1
Countercompensation H 19.5 34.5 24.3
Countercompensation I - 13.4 4.5
Countercompensation J - 1.1 0.6
Countercompensation K - 3.3 1.1
INCOME REDISTRIBUTION CASE 3
3) Both Elisabeth and Catherine have the same financial wealth at their disposal. Both are born with the same level of
intelligence. They are both employed in a similar job. We know that both persons work equally hard. Through effort
and zest in the past, Elisabeth developed skills and techniques which give her a higher productivity level in the
present. Elisabeth receives for her labour an income of 300. Catherine, on the other hand, did not perform effort in
the past to develop skills and techniques. She therefore achieves a lower productivity level than Elisabeth.
Catherine receives for her labour an income of 200. The government wants to redistribute the income. Redistribution
does not influence the behaviour of the two persons. What would you consider to be a just redistribution? Please
place an asterisk * in the box of your choice. In row L you can add an own ideal redistribution.
INCOME CASE 3 (%) Answer BELGIUM BURKINA FASO INDONESIA
Intermediate compensation A - - -
Intermediate compensation B - - -
Intermediate compensation C - - -
Intermediate compensation D - - -
Intermediate compensation E - 1.1 -
Full compensation F 4.9 10.0 12.1
No Compensation G 59.3 32.2 52.0
Countercompensation H 28.4 32.2 28.9
Countercompensation I 7.4 22.3 5.8
Countercompensation J - - 0.6
Countercompensation K - 2.2 0.6
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INCOME REDISTRIBUTION CASE 4
4) Both Elisabeth and Catherine have the same financial wealth at their disposal. Both are born with the same level of
intelligence. They are both employed in a similar job. We know that both persons work equally hard. An intelligence
test has shown that Elisabeth has a higher natural intelligence than Catherine. Due to her higher level of intelligence,
Elisabeth achieves a higher level of productivity than Catherine. Elisabeth receives for her labour an income of 300.
Catherine, on the other hand, achieves a lower level of productivity. Catherine receives for her labour an income of
200. The government wants to redistribute the income. Redistribution does not influence the behaviour of the two
persons. What would you consider to be a just redistribution? Please place an asterisk * in the box of your choice. In
row L you can add an own ideal redistribution.
INCOME CASE 4 (%) Answer BELGIUM BURKINA FASO INDONESIA
Intermediate compensation A - - -
Intermediate compensation B - - -
Intermediate compensation C - 1.1 -
Intermediate compensation D - - -
Intermediate compensation E 1.2 - 1.8
Full compensation F 59.8 41.1 46.5
No Compensation G 34.1 28.9 37.8
Countercompensation H 3.7 20.0 10.5
Countercompensation I - 2.2 2.3
Countercompensation J 1.2 2.2 1.1
Countercompensation K - 4.5 -
INCOME REDISTRIBUTION CASE A
5) Barbara, Babette, Ann and Anna are employed in a similar job. The total labour income is 350 for Barbara, 200 for
Babette, 300 for Ann and 150 for Anna. The individual labour income is composed as follows. Barbara and Babette
receive for their labour a basic income of 200 each. Due to their lower productivity Ann and Anna receive a lower
basic income of 150 per person. These differences in productivity are the effects of differences in innate intelligence:
Barbara and Babette are more intelligent than Ann and Anna. The situation is complicated by the fact that Barbara
and Ann are hard workers which yield them an extra productivity. This extra productivity is remunerated with an
extra income of 150 each. Babette and Anna are lazy and do not yield an extra productivity. They do not receive an
extra income. The government wants to redistribute the income of this four persons. The knowledge that there will be
redistribution does not change the behaviour of the individuals. What would you consider to be a just redistribution?
The given numbers are the received subsidy (+) or the paid tax (-). Please place an asterisk * in the box of your
choice. In row H you can add an own ideal redistribution.
BARBARA BABETTE ANN ANNA
Effort
Intelligent
No effort
Intelligent
Effort
Not intelligent
No effort
Not intelligent
Subsidy (+)
or Tax (-)
Income after
redistribution
Subsidy (+)
or Tax (-)
Income after
redistribution
Subsidy (+)
or Tax (-)
Income after
redistribution
Subsidy (+)
or Tax (-)
Income after
redistribution
A +25 375 -25 175 +25 325 -25 125
B 0 350 0 200 0 300 0 150
C -25 325 -25 175 +25 325 +25 175
D +25 375 -50 150 +50 350 -25 125
E -50 300 +25 225 -25 275 +50 200
F -75 275 +25 225 -25 275 +75 225
G -100 250 +50 250 -50 250 +100 250
H
INCOME CASE A
%
Belgium Burkina Faso Indonesia Axioms
A 22.6 24.4 23.7 - Countercompensation
B 13.1 16.7 28.6 Strict Status quo
C 29.8 13.3 9.8 Strict +  Full Natural solution
D 20.2 21.1 11.3 - Countercompensation
E 2.4 10.0 4.9 - Proportional solution
F 1.2 1.1 1.0 Full Progressive solution
G 1.2 5.6 0.5 Full Egalitarian solution
H 9.5 7.8 20.2 - Solutions of respondents
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INCOME REDISTRIBUTION CASE B
6) Paul, Peter, John and Charles are employed in a similar job. The total labour income is 650 for Paul, 400 for Peter,
350 for John and 200 for Charles. The individual labour income is composed as follows. Paul and Peter receive for
their labour a basic income of 400 each. Due to their lower productivity John and Charles receive a lower basic
income of 200 per person. These differences in productivity are the effects of differences in innate intelligence: Paul
and Peter are more intelligent than John and Charles. The situation is complicated by the fact that Paul and John are
hard workers. They work every week 5 hours more than Peter and Charles. For this additional hours Paul receives
250 extra. Due to his lower productivity John only earns 150 extra for his additional effort. Peter and Charles are lazy
and do not work additional hours. They do not receive an extra income. The government wants to redistribute the
income of this four persons. The knowledge that there will be redistribution does not change the behaviour of the
individuals. What would you consider to be a just redistribution? The given numbers are the received subsidy (+) or
the paid tax (-). Please place an asterisk * in the box of your choice. In row K you can add an own ideal
redistribution.
PAUL PETER JOHN CHARLES
Effort
Intelligent
No effort
Intelligent
Effort
Not intelligent
No effort
Not intelligent
Subsidy (+)
or Tax (-)
Income after
redistribution
Subsidy (+)
or Tax (-)
Income after
redistribution
Subsidy (+)
or Tax (-)
Income after
redistribution
Subsidy (+)
or Tax (-)
Income after
redistribution
A -250 400 0 400 +50 400 +200 400
B -100 550 -100 300 +100 450 +100 300
C -150 500 -100 300 +150 500 +100 300
D -50 600 -150 250 +150 500 +50 250
E -175 475 -75 325 +125 475 +125 325
F 0 650 0 400 0 350 0 200
G -125 525 -125 275 +125 475 +125 325
H -50 600 -50 350 +50 400 +50 250
I +50 700 -50 350 +50 400 -50 150
J -200 450 0 400 +50 400 +150 350
K
INCOME CASE B
%
Belgium Burkina Faso Indonesia Axioms
A 1.2 3.3 1.5 Full Egalitarian
B 2.4 1.1 2.0 Strict -
C 16.9 3.3 2.0 Full -
D 7.2 6.7 0.5 - -
E 7.2 3.3 - Full -
F 9.7 20.0 25.1 Strict Status quo
G 6.0 2.2 0.5 Strict -
H 6.0 11.1 9.8 Strict Natural solution look-alike
I 25.3 32.2 37.4 - Countercompensation
J - 2.2 2.0 - -
K 18.1 14.5 18.2 - Solutions of respondents
K - - 1.0 Strict Solutions of respondents
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PART TWO: HEALTH CASES
Now we start the second part, in which we will check in a more direct manner your ideas about justice and
redistribution. There are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers. It is important for us that you do not change anything in the
previous pages.
7) Do you think that the government has to pay an equal subsidy to all people with the same genetic characteristics, i.e.
people with the same innate inclination to become ill?
Yes ❒ .............. go to question 11.
No ❒ .............. go to question 8.
8) Medical expenses are not only caused by the illness of individuals, but also by their personal choice for a private
room or a common room. Do you think that people who take the same decisions concerning their room in the hospital
should bear the same amount of medical expenses?
Yes ❒ .............. go to question 16.
No ❒ .............. go to question 9.
9) Recall your answer to question 5. Which reasoning have you followed to come to your decision?
............................................... go to question 10.
10) Recall your answer to question 6. Which reasoning have you followed to come to your decision?
............................................... go to the third part of this questionnaire.
11) Recall your answer to question 5. Have you chosen row B or C?
Yes ❒ .............. go to question 13.
No ❒ .............. go to question 12.
12) If you have not chosen row B or C in question 5, this means that you have given either both Chris and John or both
Tim and Tom a different subsidy although they have the same genetic constitution. Are you now inclined to change
your answer to question 5?
Yes new choice = .... go to question 13.
No why not?
............................................................ go to question 13.
13) Recall your answer to question 6. Have you chosen row B, F, G or H?
Yes ❒ .............. go to question 15.
No ❒ .............. go to question 14.
14) If you have not chosen B, F, G or H in question 6, this means that you have given either both Bart and Bert or both
Hans and Henk a different subsidy although they have the same genetic constitution. Are you now inclined to change
your answer to question 6?
Yes new choice = .... go to question 15.
No why not?
............................................................ go to question 15.
15) Medical expenses are not only caused by the illness of individuals, but also by their personal choice for a private
room or a common room. Do you think that people who take the same decisions concerning their room in the hospital
should bear the same amount of medical expenses?
Yes ❒ ............. go to question 16.
No ❒ .............. go to the third part of this questionnaire.
16) Recall your answer to question 5. Have you chosen row C, F or G?
Yes ❒ .............. go to question 18.
No ❒ .............. go to question 17.
17) If you have not chosen row C, F or G in question 5, this means that, according to your intuition either both John
and Tom or both Chris and Tim have to bear a different amount of the medical expenses, although they have made the
same decisions concerning the room in the hospital. Are you now inclined to change your answer to question 5?
Yes new choice = .... go to question 18.
No why not?
............................................................ go to question 18.
18) Recall your answer to question 6. Have you chosen row A, C or E?
Yes ❒ .............. go to the third part of this questionnaire.
No ❒ .............. go to question 19.
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19) If you have not chosen A, C or E in question 6, this means that, according to your intuition either both Bart and
Hans or both Bert and Henk have to bear a different amount of the medical expenses, although they have made the same
decisions concerning the room in the hospital. Are you now inclined to change your answer to question 6?
Yes new choice = .... go to the third part of this questionnaire.
No why not?
............................................................ go to the third part of this questionnaire.
PART TWO: INCOME REDISTRIBUTION CASES
Now we start the second part in which we will check in a more direct manner your ideas about justice and
redistribution. There are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers. It is important for us that you do not change anything in the
previous pages.
7) Do you think that the government should treat people with the same innate talents in the same way, i.e. that they pay
the same taxes or receive the same subsidy?
Yes ❒ .............. go to question 11.
No ❒ .............. go to question 8.
8) Do you think that people who perform the same effort should claim an equal income?
Yes ❒ .............. go to question 16.
No ❒ .............. go to question 9.
9) Look at your answer to question 5. Which reasoning have you followed to come to your decision?
............................................. go to question 10.
10) Look at your answer to question 6. Which reasoning have you followed to come to your decision?
............................................ go to the third part of this questionnaire.
11) Look at your answer to question 5. Have you chosen row B or C?
Yes ❒ .............. go to question 13.
No ❒ .............. go to question 2.
12) If you have not chosen row B or C in question 5, this means that, according to your intuition either both Barbara
and Babette or both Ann and Anna have to pay different taxes (or have to receive a different subsidy), although they
have the same innate talents. Are you now inclined to change your answer to question 5?
Yes new choice = .... go to question 13.
No why not?
............................................................ go to question 13.
13) Look at your answer to question 6. Have you chosen row B, F, G or H?
Yes ❒ .............. go to question 14.
No ❒ .............. go to question 15.
14) If you have not chosen row B, F, G or H in question 6, this means that, according to your intuition either both Paul
and Peter or both John and Charles have to pay different taxes (or have to receive a different subsidy), although they
have the same innate talents. Are you now inclined to change your answer to question 6?
Yes new choice = .... go to question 15.
No why not?
............................................................ go to question 15.
15) Do you find that people who perform the same effort should claim an equal income?
Yes ❒ .............. go to question 16.
No ❒ .............. go to the third part of this questionnaire.
16) Look at your answer to question 5. Have you chosen row C, F or G?
Yes ❒ .............. go to question 18.
No ❒ .............. go to question 17.
17) If you have not chosen C, F or G in question 5, this means that, according to your intuition either both Barbara and
Ann or both Babette and Anna receive a different income, although they perform the same effort. Are you now inclined
to change your answer to question 5?
Yes new choice = .... go to question 18.
No why not?
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............................................................ go to question 18.
18) Look at your answer to question 6. Have you chosen row A, C or E?
Yes ❒ .............. go to the third part of this questionnaire.
No ❒ .............. go to question 19.
19) If you have not chosen A, C or E in question 6, this means that, according to your intuition either Paul and John or
both Peter and Charles receive a different income, although they perform the same effort. Are you now inclined to
change your answer to question 6?
Yes new choice = .... go to the third part of this questionnaire.
No why not?
............................................................ go to the third part of this questionnaire.
PART THREE
20) Suppose that a certain amount of food is distributed between some persons. You can dispose of an additional
amount of food but this amount can or may only be allocated to one person. This person therefore will get a greater
amount of food. All the other persons will keep their former amounts and thus get nothing less. Do you find this
possible distribution an improvement in comparison with the original distribution? (Indicate your answer by an asterisk
in the box following your choice.)
Yes ❏ ----------------  go to question 21.
No ❏ ----------------  go to question 22.
21) Suppose now that this additional amount of food necessarily has to be allocated to the person who already has the
greatest amount in the original distribution. The richest will become richer but no one of the other persons will be worse
off. Do you find that, in this special case, the new distribution is still an improvement in comparison with the original
distribution? (Indicate your answer by an asterisk in the box following your choice.)
Yes ❏ ----------------  go to question 23.
No ❏ ----------------  go to question 23.
22) Suppose now that this additional amount of food necessarily has to be allocated to the person who already has the
smallest amount in the original distribution. The poorest will improve his situation but no one of the other persons will
be worse off. Do you find that, in this special case, the new distribution is still worse than the original distribution?
(Indicate your answer by an asterisk in the box following your choice.)
Yes ❏ ----------------  go to question 23.
No ❏ ----------------  go to question 23.
23) Thank you for your collaboration!
